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NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-DUE PROCESS OF LAW-PROPOSED UNI-
FORM POST CONVICTION PROCEDURE ACT FOR NORTH DAKoTA.-Un-
der the common law a person convicted of crime had two remedies
for challenging the validity or correctness of his conviction. Habeas
corpus was available to question the jurisdiction of the convicting
court over the person charged with crime or over the offense itself.'
Another remedy, coram nobis, was used to set aside a judgment and
to grant a new trial, by correcting an error of fact which would
have prevented conviction had it been known to the court and the
accused at the trial. 2 Neither of these remedies were substitutes
for direct review.' The scope of the guaranteed protection of habeas
corpus is as broad in the United States as it was under common law,4
and in some jurisdictions it has been expanded by statute.' How-
ever, coram nobis has declined in significance, being preserved
only in a few states.6
Most states have added various other post-conviction remedies
intending to preserve or improve upon the common law protection
afforded to persons convicted of crime.7 Occasionally, the resultant
complication of state post conviction remedies, in conjunction with
the federal doctrine of exhaustion of state remedies, has seriously
deterred claims of denial of due process." This doctrine requires
the pursuit of all available state remedies before a claimed denial
of due process can be brought before the United States Supreme
Court.9
The small number of cases in North Dakota in which a denial
of due process is claimed requires that the post-conviction statutes
and practices of other jurisdictions be reviewed to illustrate the
inherent weaknesses of post-conviction remedies in North
1. Habeas Corpus Act, 31 Car. 2, c. 2 (1679). See 10 Halsbury, Laws of England §
99 (1909).
2. People v. Walton, 10 Cal. App. 2d 413, 51 P.2d 1117 (1935) (dictum).
3. 10 Halsbury, Laws of England § 101 (1909).
4. ND. Const. art. 1, § 5; N.D.Rev Code §32-2217 (1943).
5. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Supp. 1953); Ill. Ann. Stat. c. 38, §§ 826-832 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1955); N. C. Gen. Stat. §§15-217-222 (1953).
6. People v. Smith 296 IlI.App. 636, 15 N.E.2d 604 (1938); Hawk v. State, 151
Neb. 717, 39 N.W.2d 561, 565 (1949) (dictum); Bojinoff v. People, 299 N.Y. 145, 85 N.
E.2d 909 (1909).
7. E.g. Minn. Stat. § 547.01 (1946) (new trial); Minn. Stat. § 606.01 (1946)
(certiorari).
8. Huffman v. Alexander, 197 Ore. 283, 253 P.2d 289, 290 (1953) (The defendant
was sentenced to three years in the penitentiary. He served his term and was released more
than two months before the Oregon Supreme Court was able to decide that the defendant
should have been released on habeas corpus.)
9. Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114, (1944); Mohler v. State of Michigan, 216 F.2d 675
(6th Cir. 1954); Kramer v. State of Nevada, 122 F.2d 417 (9th Cir. 1941).
NoTmS
Dakota.10 The practice of Illinois courts under their former
statutory remedies offer the best example of a breakdown of con-
ventional post-conviction remedies." In addition, the use of the
new Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act best shows the effect of
a statute embracing the expanded concept of substantive and
procedural due process first announced in Powell v. State of
Alabama.1" The improved federal post-conviction remedy will be
discussed, since it is the basis of the Uniform Post-Conviction Act
and other expanded state post-conviction remedies. 13 Finally, the
proposed Act will be outlined to show how criminal process in
North Dakota would be affected by its adoption.
Following the decision of Powell v. State of Alabama, the United
States Supreme Court has stated that states must give persons
convicted of a crime some clearly defined method by which they
may claim denial of fundamental rights1" and they must give a
convicted person an opportunity to question the intrinsic fairness
of a criminal process even though it appears proper on the record. 5
These fundamental rights include the assistance of counsel during
questioning, arraignment and trial;" confrontation of prosecuting
witnesses;'- freedom from use of coerced confessions;- and freedom
from systematic exclusion of defendant's race from the jury.19 The
asserted denial of Due Process is to be tested by all the facts in a
given case.*°
10. See State v. Whiteman, 67 N.W.2d 599 (N.D. 1954); State v. Malnourie, 67 N.W.
2d 330 (N.D. 1954); State v. Magrurn, 76 N.D. 531, 38 N.W.2d 358 (1949). A survey
was made by the author to determine the incidence in North Dakota of petitions for the
writ of habeas corpus and of motions for new trial based on facts outside the record. The
cooperating States Attorneys of five selected counties reported that during the calendar
years 1950 through 1955 there were approxmately 3,593 criminal prosecutions resulting in
conviction. They also reported that during those years there were no petitions for the
writ of habeas corpus based on criminal convictions and only one motion for new trial
based on facts outside the record.
11. See Marino v. Ragen, 332 U.S. 561 (1947).
12. 278 U.S. 45 (1932).
13. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Supp. 1952); 111. Ann. Stat. c. 38, §§ 826-832 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1955); N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 15-217-222 (1953). Uniform Post Conviction Procedure
Act, Handbook of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws'202-215
(1955). Copies of this Act may be obtained from:
National Conference on Uniform State Laws,
1155 East Sixtieth Street,
Chicago 37, Illinois.
14. Young v. Ragen 337 U.S. 235, 239 (1948) (dictum).
15. Carter v. Illinois, 329 U.S. 173, 175 (1946)(dictum).
16. N.D. Rev. Code § 29-1303 (1943)(In North Dakota the right of assignment nf
counsel springs from the statute and not from the constitution.)
17. United States v. Keown, 19 F. Supp. 639 (W.D. Ky. 1937).
18. Brown v. Mississippi, 279 U.S. 103 (1936); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332
(1943) (Holding that confessions obtained from defendants after fourteen hours of eon-
tious questioning without benefit of counsel or friends were coerced and therefore in-
admissible against them.)
19. Powell v. State, 61 Okla.Crim.App. 267, 63 P.2d 113 (1936) (held, defendant
could not require that members of his race be included on his specific jury)..
20. Betts %. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 462, (1942)(dictum).
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ILLINOIS POST-CONVICTION PROCEDURE
Prior to 1945, prisoners in the Illinois Penitentiary were required
by order of the Warden to secure assistance of counsel before they
could petition Illinois courts for a writ of habeas corpus.2 Thus
prisoners who could not afford counsel were, in effect, denied the
writ. The validity of this regulation was questioned in United States
ex rel Bongiorno v. Ragen,"22 and it was regarded as an exhaustion
of the state remedies, because there was no remedy available. As
an aftermath of this decision six hundred thirty-eight petitions
alleging deprivation of constitutional rights were brought before
the Illinois courts within three years.2 1 Many of these petitions were
subsequently appealed to the United States Supreme Court;
24
however nearly all of them were denied on the ground that the
petitioner had not exhausted the state remedies. 25 At that time,
there were three Illinois remedies which prisoners could utilize.
The first was habeas corpus, which was an independant remedy
solely to challenge convictions in excess of a court's jurisdiction."t
The second, was statutory coram nobis, which was available where
new facts were presented which if known to the court would have
prevented conviction.2 The third, was a writ of error which could
be used to correct items appearing on the record.28 The three
remedies had one factor in common. None of them could be used to
disprove recitals of procedural due process appearing in the record. 2
Clearly not in all cases do these remedies satisfy the requirements of
the broadened concept of Due Process of Law enunciated in the
Powell case.
The inadequacy of these remedies is demonstrated by a review
of several typical cases which reached the United States Supreme
Court after United States ex rel Bongiorno v. Ragen. The first of
these cases was a habeas corpus proceeding for failure to provide
an attorney who would perform his duties for the accused. 30 The
petition had been denied by the Illinois Supreme Court without
21. United States ex rel Bongiorno v. Ragen, 54 F.Supp. 973 (N.D. M. 1944); a#'d,
146 F.2d 349 (7th Cir. 1944).
22. 54.F.Supp. 973 (N.D. Ill. 1944).
23. Marino v. Ragen, 332 U.S. 561, 563 (1947) (dictum) (Petitions to the United States
Supreme Court from Illinois during 1945, 1946, and 1947 alleging deprivation of due
process in criminal procedure represent slightly more than half of the total of such petitions
to the Supreme Court from all the states during those years.)
24. E.g. White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760 (1945); Woods v. Nierstheimer, 328 U.S. 211
(1946).
25. White v. Ragen supra note 24.
26. People v. Loftus, 400 Il. 495, 81 N.E.2d 495, 498 (1948) (dictum).
27. Ibid.; People v. Tuohy, 397 Ill. 19, 72 N.E.2d 827 (1947).
28. People v. Loftus, supra note 26.
.29. Ibid.
30. White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760 (1945).
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opinion, apparently because an issue of fact was presented.
Certiorari was granted by the Supreme Court, but the petition was
denied on the respondent's claim that Illinois law did not allow
issues of fact to be brought in an action for writ of habeas corpus,
the proper remedy being coram nobis.31 Another case was on
petition for writ of error based on the common law record. 2 The
petition to the Supreme Court of the United States was denied on
the ground that the Illinois Supreme Court had held that the alleged
deprivation of due process could not be proven on writ of error
and that the petitioner should have used the other remedies provid-
ed. :; Another case, Marino v. Ragen,34 was appealed from an
Illinois Circuit Court decision denying a petition for writ of habeas
corpus. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment because the
decision was not appealable to the Illinois Supreme Court, hence,
the petitioner had been denied Due Process of Law. Each of these
examples of the many cases seems proper when viewed alone. How-
ever, when considered together with the multitude of other appeals
from Illinois courts they illustrate the marked tendency of those
courts to submit to the recurring argument of the prosecution, that
the petitioner should have utilized some other remedy. 5 Prisoners
were thus forced to thread uncertainly through extended proced-
ures before gaining the right to a federal hearing. The dilatory
action of Illinois officials nearly caused the assumption by federal
courts of jurisdiction in such cases without requiring prior exhaus-
tion of Illinios remedies. 6
Shortly after the decision of Marino v. Ragen, Illinois passed its
present Post-Conviction Hearing Act,37 which is patterned after
the federal post-conviction statute.3 8 These statutes as well as a
similar North Carolina Act passed in 1951, 3 provided the foundation
for the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act. The present Illinois
statute provides that the new and additional remedy is original and
independent, and allows facts to be alleged which are outside the
record, but which tend to show that the prisoner was deprived of
31. Id. at 767.
32. See Foster v. Illinois, 332 U.S. 134 (1947).
33. See note 32 supra.
34. 332 U.S. 561 (1947).
35. See Marino v. lagen, 332 U.S. 561,568 (dictum) (Charactarizing Illinois precedures
as described by the respondent Attorney General as a labyrinth of blind alleys, useful only
in convincing the federal courts that the petitioners had used the wrong remedy.)
36. Id. at 570 (stating that the doctrine of exhaution of state remedies should not be
stretched to require pursuit of the ineffective and inadequate remedies of Illinois.)
37. Ill. Laws (1949) p. 722, Ill. Ann. Stat. c. 38, §§ 826-832 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1955)
38. 62 Stat. 967 (1948), as amended, 63 Stat. 105 (1949), 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Supp.
1952).
39. N.C. Laws c. 1083, 1 (1951), N.C. Gen. Stat. J§ 15-217-22 (1953).
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some fundamental right. Unlike the prior remedy of habeas corpus
the action is res judicata, but subject to review by the Illinois
Supreme Court.40 Thus Illinois has solved a procedural dilemma
affecting hundreds of petitioners.41 The dockets there are still
crowded with petitions brought under the new procedure. 42 A
reason assigned for the superficial failure of the statute is that the
remedy should have been made exclusive rather than additional.43
The proposed Uniform Law assumes the recommended form. 44
NORTH DAKOTA POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES
Like Illinois remedies before enactment of the new procedure, the
statutory North Dakota remedies of motion to set aside judgment
and for new trial, 4 appeal and error,4 6 habeas corpus,4" and certi-
orari, 4 cannot except as specifically provided, question matters
outside the record.4 9 An additional "remedy" of a motion which is
in the nature of coram nobis, has been allowed only three times
in the form of a motion to set aside judgment where the grounds
were fraud and duress. The motion is also available, "under such
circumstances that the court was without jurisdicition."' It appears
that this remedy is peculiar to North Dakota. Superior to all actions
in the lower courts is the discretionary right of the North Dakota
Supreme Court to exercise the constitutionally granted power of
superintending control. 1 This power may be exercised in emer-
gencies to avoid a serious miscarriage of justice, wherever there is
no adequate and speedy remedy.53 Thus North Dakota has the
40. Il1. Ann. Stat. c. 38, § 832 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1955).
41. See Marino v. Ragen, 332 U.S. 561 (1947)
42. See U. 111. L. Forum 481, 485 (1953).
43. Ibid.
44. Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act § 1.
45. N.D. Rev. Code c. 29-24 (1943).
46. N.D. Rev. Code c. 29-28 (1943).
47. N.D. Rev. Code c. 32-22 (1943).
48. N.D. Rev. Code c. 32-33 (1943).
49. N.D. Rev. Code § 29-2402 (Supp. 1953).
50. State v. Whiteman, 67 N.W.2d 599 (N.D. 1954); State v. Malnourie, 67 N.W.2d
330 (N.D. 1954) (The defendants in the above cases were taken together to a place where
it was suspected that the body of a murder victim bad been hidden. In a effort to obtain
confessions of guilt police officials threatened and struck the defendant, Malnourie, and tied
the defendant, Whiteman, by his wrists to a winch and to a post, telling him that he, "had
better talk or be torn apart."); State v. Magrum, 76 N.D. 527, 38 N.W.2d 358 (1949)
(Coroner's inquest completed by 4:30 p.m. of the day after the alleged murder victim
was found. By 9:00 p.m. of the same day the minor defendant, without benefit of counsel
or friends, was en route to the penitentiary after being arraigned, tried and convicted on
his confession obtained by threats and promises of police officials.).
51. State v. Magrum, 76 N.D. 527, 38 N.W.2d 358, 359 (1949) (dictum).
52. N.D. Const. art. 4, § 86; State ex rel Schafer v. District Court, 49 N.D. 1127, 194
N.W. 745 (1923).
53. State ex rel Johnson v. Broderick, 75 N.D. 340, 358, 27 N.W.2d 849, 859 (1947)
("In this state no appeal lies from a decision in a habeas corpus proceeding. But the
action of a district court in such proceeding may be reviewed and controlled through the
exercise of the power of superintending, control even though, the trial, court has entered
a final order discharging the petitioner.").
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remedies of appeal and error, and certiorari which cannot look
behind the record and must be taken within the statutory time
limits allowed. 54 The remedy of a motion for new trial falls within
the preceeding category with the exception that it allows the proof
of certain facts outside the record. 55 The extraordinary remedy of
habeas corpus must also be based on the record and can only
challenge the jurisdiction of the convicting court,56 however, it
may be taken at any time. 7 Like its original Illinois counterpart, 8
North Dakota habeas corpus is not reviewable by the high court of
the state.59 Only a motion in the nature of coram nobis and a peti-
tion for the exercise of superintending control can regularly ques-
tion proceedings outside the record.6 0 It appears that the existing
North Dakota post-conviction remedies, though somewhat different
in form are fully as complicated as were those formerly obtaining
in Illinois. In North Dakota actions by convicted persons based on
denial of fundamental rights are rare.61 When such claimed denials
of rights can be found in the record the existing remedies are
adequate. But where denial of due process cannot be shown by the
record, or does not qualify as an exception to the requirement of
record proof,62 the convicted person claiming the denial faces an
intricate procedural gauntlet as formidable as the late and con-
demned system of Illinois.
6 3
FEDERAL POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES
Federal post-conviction appeals from state courts must be taken
directly to the United States Supreme Court.6 4 Federal habeas
corpus is broader in scope than the corresponding remedies in
most states.65 Regularity in procedural allegations is not insisted
upon;6 6 and the allegations of the petitions are to be construed in
54. N.D. Rev. Code J§ 29-2806, 29-2808 (1943) (Six months is the maximum time
regularly allowed on appeal and error); N.D. Rev. Code J 32-3301 (1943) (Certiorari
may be granted at the discretion of the Supreme Court to prevent a miscarriage of
justice).
55. N.D. Rev. Code § 29-2402, (1) (4) (7) (Supp. 1953).
56. E.g. Ex parte Moore, 71 N.D. 274, 300 N.W. 37 (1941).
57. N.D. Rev. Code § 32-2233 (1943).
58. Il. Ann. Stat. c. 65, § 22 (Smith-Hurd 1936).
59. Carruth v. Taylor, 8 N.D. 166, 77 N.W. 617 (1898) (leading case); See note 53
supra.
60. State v. Magrum, 76 N.D. 527, 38 N.W.2d 358 (1949) (coram nobis); State ex
rel Schafer v. District Court, 49 N.D. 1127, 194 N.W. 745 (1923) (superintending control).
61. See report of author's survey supra note 10.
62. See note 55 supra.
63. See Jenner, The Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act, 9 F.R.D. 347 (1950).
64. Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S; 114, 117 (1944) (dictum) (When appeals to the United
States Supreme Court have been exhausted habeas corpus will lie in federal, district court.)
65. Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101. 105 (1942) (dictum).
66. Baker v. Ellis, 194 F.2d 865 '(5th Cir. 1952).
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the petitioner's favor.67 "It extends also to those exceptional cases
where the writ is the only effective means of preserving his rights."68
The writ will lie when the time for appeal has expired, 69 except for
impeachment of the record of conviction.-, Nor will it lie to correct
the record.
71
A supplemental statute was enacted in 1948 which provides a
simplified remedy to correct erroneous convictions without resort
to habeas corpus. 72 It contains a special provision for appeals with-
out cost to prisoners unable to pay; and is not restricted to an
examination of the record. This statute is the basic post-conviction
procedure statute from which the Illinois,'7 North Carolina 7  and
Uniform post-conviction acts are derived. The Supreme Court has
held that even the exhaustion or lapse of the above federal remedies
will not preclude further action where sound reason exists for
failure to seek earlier relief.71 In those instances an action in the
nature of coram nobis will lie to examine facts outside the record
to determine whether the petitioner's fundamental rights have been
protected. 76 Since the decision in Powell v. State of Alabama, which
was directed primarily to state authority, Congress and the federal
courts have diligently attempted to insure that every convicted
person, indigent or not, will be assured of full and prompt Due
Process of Law under the Fifth Amendment. 7  Apparently, the
several states have been less diligent in securing the substantive
constitutional rights of convicted persons, perhaps because they
have not recognized the problem.
PROVISIONS OF THE UNIFORM POST-CONVICTION
PROCEDURE ACT
The Uniform Law proposed by the National Conference of
commissioners on Uniform States Laws and approved bj, the Amer-
ican Bar Association attempts to provide complete state protection
67. Anderson v. Eidson, 191 F.2d 989 (8th Cir. 1951)
68. See note 65 supra.
69. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
70. Williams v. Huff, 146 F.2d 867 (D.C.App. 1945) (order discharging writ of
habeas corpus reversed on other grounds.)
71. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Supp. 1952) (This statute affords a method of correcting
the record, making resort to habeas corpus for this purpose unwarranted.)
72. See note 71 supra.
73. IM. Ann. Stat. c. 38 §1 826-832.(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1955).
74. N.C. Gen. Stat. J§ 15-217-22 (1953).
75. United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502 (1954) (Continued litigation after final
judgment and exhiustion or waiver of any statutory right of review should be allowed only
under circumstances compelling such action to achieve justice.).
76. Id. at 572,
77. See note 72, supra; Lisbena v. California, 314. U.S. 219 (1941) "'As applied to a
criminal trial denial of due process is the failure to observe the fundamental fairness
essential to the very concept of justice."
NomS
of procedural and substantive Due Process of Law. The *proposed
act combines features of the Federal, Illinois and North Carolina
post-conviction acts. "The remedy herein provided is not a sub-
stitute for nor does it affect any remedies which are incident to
the proceedings in the trial court, or any remedy of direct review
of the sentence or conviction but, except as otherwise provided in
this Act, it comprehends and takes the place of all other common
law and statutory remedies which have heretofore been available
for challenging the validity of incarceration under sentence of
(death or) imprisonment, and shall be used exclusively in lieu
thereof. A petition for relief under this Act may be filed at any
time."7s Thus stated the Act would encompass the North Dakota
remedies of habeas corpus,79 and motion to set aside judgment and
for new trial,80 but it would not be a substitute for appeal and
error8' nor certiorari. 2 Under this Act an apparently perfect record
does not bar the examination of allegations of denial of fundamental
rights provable only outside the record.
Venue of the action is the place of conviction, and may be
brought by persons with or without funds, who, at the discretion of
the court need not appear. Under conventional habeas corpus
statutes the petitioner is regularly required to be present at the
hearing."' It appears that this requirement can be used by peti-
tioners having groundless claims to obtain a free ride out of the
penitentiary to the nearest court.8 Several objectives are met by
the provisions recited in this paragraph. First, the court at the
place of confinement will only consider petitions which arise from
its own proceedings, the remaining petitions being returned to the
convicting courts. Second, the rights of indigent prisoners are
protected, gince the costs of such actions are chargeable to the
county where judgment was rendered."5 Third, an incentive for
making harrassing repetitions and groundless petitions for writs of
habeas has been removed, since a petitioner need not be present
at his bearing."'
78. Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act, 1.
79. N.D. Rev. Code c. 32-22 (1943).
80. N.D. Rev. Code c. 29-24 (1943).
81. N.D. Rev. Code c. 29-28 (1943).
82. N.D. Rev. Code c. 32-33 (1943).
83. E.g. N.D. Rev. Code § 32-2212 (1943).
84. Dorsey v. Gill, 148 F.2d 857, 862 (D.C. App. 1945) (dictum) "The most extreme
example is -that of a person who, between. July 1939 and April 1944 presented in the
District Court 50 petitions for habeas corpus;" Mazakahomni v. State, 75 N.D. 73, 25
N.W.2d 772, 778 (1947)(dictum).
85. Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act, § 5.
86. See note" 84 su pra.
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The Act further provides that petitioners must gather all the facts
and documents, known to him, which support his claim and present
them in this single action. Unless presented in the original petition
all claims will be waived, except where new facts later arise of
which petitioner could not reasonably have had knowledge. Final
disposition of the petition is res judicata, and constitutes a final
judgment for the purposes of review. This final judgment would be
reviewable by the supreme court of the adopting state.87 It will be
observed that the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act has been
designed to insure a simple, speedy and effective means of raising
nd disposing of constitutional questions arising out of crimnial
process.
CONCLUSION
The Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act appears to provide
a fair and effective remedy to such persons as may fall victim to
the error of state law enforcement officials and the courts. The pro-
visions of the almost identical Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act
have been fully tested and proved in recent Illinois and Supreme
Court decisions.8 8 The mandate of Powell v. State of Alabama re-
quires that state courts provide Due Process of Law in fact as well
as form. The substantive guarantees of fundamental rights cannot
be insured where available post-conviction remedies only allow
examination of facts found in the record,8 9 or are restricted to
particular or extraordinary facts found outside the record.90 The
laws of North Dakota as construed, are not adequate to give full
application to the expanded concept of Due Process of Law as pre-
scribed by the United States Supreme Court. North Dakota needs,
and the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act can provide, an
effective antidote to the toxin of unconstitutional criminal prosecu-
tion regardless of the form in which it should appear.
KIRK B. SMITH
87. Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act J§ 7-9. (The waiver of claims not stated and
res judicata character of the final order are designed to prevent groundless and repetitious
claims of denial of due process. The final order is made reviewable by the adopting state's
supreme court to provide a uniform and adequate state remedy.)
88. E.g. People v. Evans, 412 I1. 616, 107 N.E.2d 839 (1952) (directing that pauper's
petitions be liberally construed); People v. Dale, 406 I. 238, 92 N.E.2d 761 (1950)
(upholding constitutionality of the Act). See also State v. Hackney, 240 N.C. 230, 81 S.E.
2d 778 (1954) (This is the third and latest North Carolina interpretation of its Post-Con-
viction Act.)
89. Carter v. Illinois, 329 U.S. 173, 175 (1946) (dictum).
90. See State v. Magrum, 75 N.D. 527, 38 N.W.2d 358 (1949) (fraud and duress).
